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Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the opportunities that Wireless Network Virtualization (WNV) can bring
for spectrum sharing by focusing on the regulatory framework that has been deployed by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) for the 3.5GHz band. Pairing this regulatory approach with WNV
permits us to present a sharing proposal where emphasis is made on increasing resource availability and
providing flexible methods for negotiating for resource access. We include an economics framework that aims
at presenting an additional perspective on the attainable outcomes of our sharing proposal. We find that by
pairing regulatory flexibility with an enabling technology, within an appropriate economics context, we can
increase resource access opportunities and enhance current sharing arrangements.
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1. Introduction
The complexity of managing electromagnetic spectrum
is not purely technical. There are crucial economic
and regulatory implications that determine whether
an alternative for making more efficient use of this
resource would be beneficial or detrimental. Therefore,
we perform an analysis that goes beyond the existing
technical barriers and extends along three axes:
regulation, technology and economics.
In this work, we focus on the 3.5GHz band and
its regulation as well as the innovative technology of
Wireless Network Virtualization (WNV) to explore the
opportunities and challenges in introducing sharing
opportunities. Our study focuses on one particular
approach of WNV that is built on resource pooling.
Thus, we will study the characteristics of resource
pools, the interaction between user types (Incumbents,
Priority Access and General Authorized Access users)
and how economic considerations drive the definition
of networks and the resulting types of competition.
We expect that this comprehensive analysis will permit
us to solidify the basis for further deployment of an
appropriate virtualization environment for spectrum
sharing.
This paper is organized as follows: the regulatory
framework for the 3.5GHz band is presented in section
∗Corresponding author. Email: mbw@pitt.edu
2; section 3 includes a description of WNV and the
particular approach that will be considered in this
work; section 4 includes a technical analysis, which
presents the two models that could be adapted to the
opportunities offered by regulation in the 3.5GHz band;
section 5 analyzes three important aspects associated
with Economics, which target at framing our model
within this context, and finally, sections 7 and 8 present
our conclusions and future work, respectively.
2. 3.5GHz Band: CurrentStatus
To date, the 3.5 GHz band in the U.S. has been allocated
to federal services (e.g.,DoD radar systems), Fixed Satel-
lite Service (FSS) and, for a finite period, to grandfa-
thered terrestrial wireless operations in the 3650 - 3700
MHz band[1]. The Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) and the National Telecommunications and
Information Agency (NTIA) have made a significant
effort toward opening this band for shared operations
between federal and commercial users. The FCC has
referred to this band as an “innovation band,” given
that the main objective is to enable new spectrum access
models that allow the use of modern technologies, thus
enabling a move away from legacy spectrum manage-
ment categories: Federal vs. Non-Federal; Licensed vs.
Unlicensed and Carrier vs. Private [1]. The basis of this
new spectrum sharing scheme is a three-tiered model
for spectrum access, with each tier holding a different
level of priority: Incumbent Access, Priority Access
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Figure 1. Tentative bandplan under the 3.5 GHz sharingframework.
and General Authorized Access (GAA). Some important
characteristics of these tiers include [2]:
• Incumbent users comprise federal services and
some legacy satellite and wireless operations.
These users have superior spectrum rights over
Priority Access and GAA users at all times and in
all areas.
• The Priority Access tier consists of seven channels
of 10 MHz each, which can be assigned to Priority
Access Licensees. These licensees will have more
predictable spectrum access than GAA users.
Nevertheless, Priority Access Licenses (PALs)1
will be granted as long as the demand is greater
than the supply in the area of interest. If that is
not the case, the entire band will be allocated for
GAA use.
• General Authorized Access (GAA) will be granted
by rule. In this way, GAA users could potentially
access the entire 150 MHz band in areas where
PALs have not been issued (or are not in use)
and up to 80 MHz where PALs are in use. It is
important to note; however, that GAA users will
not be protected from interference from other
Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) users.
Through these approaches, it is expected that this three-
tiered approach will enable the adaption of spectrum
use to market and user demands. Figure 1 illustrates
the tentative bandplan, proposed by the FCC, for the
3.5 GHz band.
Sharing in the 3.5GHz band will be enabled by a
Spectrum Access System (SAS). According to [2], “[t]he
SAS serves as an advanced, highly automated frequency
coordinator across the band. It protects higher tier users
from those beneath and optimizes frequency use to
allow maximum capacity and coexistence for both GAA
and Priority Access users”. In other words, the SAS is
an entity that will be in charge of authorizing spectrum
access to CBRS users in any frequency and location.
Additionally, the SAS is in charge of providing Priority
1PALs are defined as an authorization to use a 10 MHz channel in a
single census tract for three years. These licenses will be assigned in
up to 70 MHz of the 3550 - 3650 MHz portion of the band[2].
Figure 2. Three-tier sharing framework
Access Licensees and GAA users with alternative
spectrum when they have been displaced by users
with higher priorities[3]. In general terms, the SAS
should fulfill the automated frequency assignment task
that will enhance the band management flexibility
pursued with this sharing scheme. With the flexible
access model developed for this band, the FCC aims at
creating a versatile band which will permit to adapt to
market as well as technological opportunities[2]. Figure
2 summarizes some important details regarding this
three-tiered sharing framework.
3. Wireless NetworkVirtualization:The Technology
of Choice
From the regulatory approach presented in the previous
section, we infer that flexibility for innovation is a key
policy objective. For innovation to be successful we
should not only contemplate regulatory flexibility; in
fact, we also require technology to allow for adding such
flexibility to the network. Along these lines, we find that
there is a significant link between Wireless Network
Virtualization (WNV) and adding technical flexibility
to networks and systems.
Through virtualization, different components of
the network are partitioned, combined, sliced and
abstracted to create virtual instances of the network.
Further, each type of partition, combination or
abstraction will yield distinct types of virtual networks
giving us the impression that we are working with
a new network, different from the original[4]. As a
result, multiple virtual networks operate on one single
network , each serving specific purposes and utilizing
distinct technologies. Furthermore, co-existing virtual
networks may be different from each other [5, 6],
or as stated in [7], Mobile Network Virtualization
“promises multiple personality network elements in
terms of virtual ownership by multiple operators.
That means multiple networks running virtually (i.e.,
logically) and concurrently within one physical network
equipment or hardware”. Notably, this would call for
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an important degree of isolation embedded in the
virtualized systems, which will permit a sound co-
existence of virtual entities.
With the adequate application of virtualization
technologies, we would be able to devise improved
alternatives for the use, sharing and assignment of
existing resources[8]. This could provide a degree of
flexibility that would aid in maximizing the spectrum
access and management options on the operator side.
Several alternatives for the application and deployment
of WNV have been explored. However, given the
characteristics of the new sharing framework for the
3.5GHz band, we consider virtualization from the
perspective of resource pooling. This approach requires
multiple entities/providers to share their resources in
a pool and then make them accessible to additional
users/providers. To elaborate on the resource pooling
concept, the authors in [9, 10] have compared it to
the Cloud (in a computer science context), given that,
in principle, it gives us the illusion of an infinite
amount of resources, which are available on demand
without the need to incur in high upfront commitments
and actually permitting users to pay for them on a
short-term basis or as needed. Focusing on the idea of
access on demand, we could expect that the users who
have access to the pool will be allowed to choose the
resources that are most suitable for a particular service,
but which may belong to different incumbents or access
tiers.
Centering our attention on spectrum, the objective of
pooling this resource is to “enhance spectral efficiency
by overlaying a new mobile radio system on an
existing one without requiring any changes to the
actual licensed system”[11]. Thus, the deployment
of spectrum pools would imply a different resource
allocation system, where the existing and new hardware
can be operated transparently, or in other words, as
if there were no other system concurrently present in
the same frequency range[11]. In this manner, we can
merge the key concepts behind WNV and the creation
of resource pools and present them as important
alternatives for providing enhanced spectrum access
and sharing opportunities [10–13].
4. Sharing Proposal
In this section, we provide an overview of a sharing
proposal which applies virtualization and resource
pooling concepts in order to enhance the sharing
process in the 3.5GHz and other available frequency
bands. We present this proposal through a description
of the possible network participants, the network
configuration and the applicable interactions for
resource transfer or negotiation.
4.1. Network participants
The sharing model we envision relies on three main
types of participants: resource providers (RPs), service
providers (SPs) and an intermediate entity known as
Virtual Network Builder (VNB). In what follows, we
present an overview of the roles and duties of each
participant.
Resource Providers. The RPs are current incumbents
who are willing to make their resources (or slices
thereof) available in the pool. Examples of RPs include:
• Incumbents who, after serving the traffic require-
ments of their own customers, have unused
resources and are willing to share them in the
pool, in exchange of a payment.
• Entities who are dedicated to the provision
of resources and do not have any additional
customers besides those who have access to the
pool.
Service Providers. These entities seek access to the pool
as a means to obtain the necessary resources to fulfill
the demand of their customers. Note that the SPs
are not limited to new market entrants. In fact, these
can be existing providers who, provisionally, require
additional resources to meet the traffic generated by
their customers.
Furthermore, we can think of SPs as entities
who are in charge of providing specialized services
such as access to video streaming, social media, file
storage/transfer, among others. In this way, the demand
of each SP will depend on the requirements or their
particular service.
Virtual Network Builder. The VNB is an intermediate
entity (i.e., middleman) in charge of facilitating the
transfer of resources from the pool to the SPs. For
this purpose, the VNB aggregates the pooled resources
according to the SPs’ requirements (e.g., price, service-
specific demand, etc.) and the price set by the RPs. We
expect the VNB to be a profit seeking entity (i.e., it will
charge a fee for its resource aggregation duties).
4.2. Network Description
In order to determine the type and characteristics of
the resources available in the pool and the applicable
interactions for resource access and sharing, we
contemplate two possible scenarios: a local and a global
approach.
Local Approach. This represents an initial, simple
setting for sharing, where the resource pool is
comprised of resources belonging only to the 3.5 GHz
band. As such, from the regulatory approach presented
in [2] and as shown in Figure 1, the following assets
would be available for pooling:
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• 3550 - 3650 MHz band: 0 - 70 MHz for PALs and
30 - 100 MHz for GAA
• 3650 - 3700 MHz band: 50 MHz for GAA
Given this resource limitation, in this scenario we
do not contemplate an explicit participation of or
interaction with the RPs. In fact, for the design of this
approach we focus on managing the responsibilities
of the SAS. At a minimum, the SAS is in charge of
the automated allocation of resources (i.e., spectrum
access management). Nevertheless, in a virtualized
environment, we consider the possibility of the SAS
outsourcing part of its spectrum pool management
duties to the VNB. In this light, the VNB should
negotiate with the SAS for access to the 3.5GHz band,
while taking into account the particular demand of each
of its SP customers. Thus, the SAS would treat the VNBs
as large spectrum users or operators. As such, VNBs
would auction for PALs from the SAS and compete
with other Priority Access and GAA users under the
same rules. In a broad sense, this is consistent with the
notion of polycentric governance described in [14]. This
structure is portrayed in Figure 3.
Given that the VNB should account for the resources
to serve the aggregate requirements of its customers,
the demand from the VNB should be significantly larger
than that of individual entities. When posting bids for
PALs, the VNB operations could lead to two important
consequences: 1) the VNB can compete with other
large stakeholders (e.g., Verizon, AT&T) in terms of the
amount that the latter are able to pay for obtaining a
license; 2) it is likely that the ‘demand greater than
supply’ constraint for PAL assignment will be met
given the aggregate demand carried by the VNB. In
this light, this local approach provides opportunities for
enhancing the sharing arrangements.
As shown in figure 3, there is a certain hierarchy
among the different entities that belong to this type of
network. Indeed, we could associate specific tasks and
behaviors to each layer: the SAS would be considered
as the regional spectrum access coordinator. It would
be in charge of the automated process of assigning
licenses to the entities in the layer below and, in turn,
it would remain accountable to the regulator (i.e., the
FCC) and incumbents in the layer above. The next layer
consists of the VNBs or large Network Operators who
negotiate spectrum access directly with the SAS. These
are entities that require larger spectrum assignments
than smaller SPs. The final layer of the hierarchy will
be composed of individual SPs who require spectrum
from VNBs or from large Network Operators (as in the
case of Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs)).
As previously mentioned, this approach increases the
sharing opportunities in the 3.5GHz band; however, it
does not fully exploit the capabilities of virtualization.
For the virtualization process to be evident we may
consider pooling resources that belong to multiple
providers who are willing to make them available to a
larger number of SPs. This scenario is explored in the
following section through our global approach.
Figure 3. Virtual Network Builders as part of the sharing schemein the 3.5 GHz band
4.3. Global Approach
This is a more complex arrangement that targets
at adding flexibility to the network and increasing
the access opportunities for the service providers.
In this scheme, we envision the resources of the
3.5GHz band as one of the multiple inputs to the
resource pool. Indeed, we expect the pool to be also
formed by licensed and unlicensed bands shared by
resource providers. In this way, this heterogeneous
pool would represent increased alternatives for the
VNB to aggregate resources and thus satisfy the
service requirements of a larger range of SPs. This
model follows the proposal presented in [12]; hence
an additional objective is to facilitate the creation of
service-driven networks.
The changes in the architecture under the global
approach are shown in Figure 4. Note that the VNBs
still need to negotiate with the SAS for access to the
3.5GHz band.
The virtualization process in this scenario would be
complete when we envision the pool as a set of spectrum
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Figure 4. Generalized approach for sharing and virtualization.
and infrastructure resources which can be seamlessly
accessed by the RPs and SPs. For this purpose, through
WNV, RPs could be utilizing the same infrastructure
as the one they are making available in the pool, just
on different virtual slices/partitions. If virtualization is
properly deployed, we could fully exploit the pooled
resources given that we would have the illusion of
higher virtual availability while preserving the fixed
physical resources.
The VNB would be in charge of aggregating resources
upon SPs’ demand, which will in turn depend on
the specific service that each SP intends to provide.
Given the heterogeneity of the pooled resources, for
aggregation purposes, the VNB can combine multiple
frequencies, thus being able to create a bundle with
specific capacity/rate characteristics. For instance, the
pool could be formed by spectrum on the 3.5GHz
band, LTE frequencies, 2.4GHz unlicensed spectrum.
Given an SP with an specialized service that consists of
the provision of video streaming to its end users, the
duty of the VNB is to determine how many 3.5GHz,
LTE and 2.4 GHz resource units should be combined
(and in what proportions) in order to meet the SP’s
requirements. Note that for the creation of this multi-
frequency bundle, we require the definition resource
units in terms of parameters that would be common to
all. For instance, we might define resources in terms of
time-frequency units that specify their availability and
service characteristics.
Note that at the basis we would still have physical
resources, which are partitioned and assembled in
different ways. Hence, we expect the SPs to be
compatible and capable of using the resources offered
by the VNB. One method to determine the suitability
of resources is to evaluate their level of fungibility with
the preferred resources of each SP [15].
Throughout the description of these approaches we
have referred to interactions taking place between
SPs and VNBs and VNBs and the resource pool. In
what follows, we describe these interactions and the
applicable methods.
4.4. Participants’ Interactions
From the network model presented in 4.2, we infer
that the main objective of the interactions among
participants is to negotiate for resource access. Along
these lines, we deem appropriate to consider a market
mechanism in order to define these interactions and the
final allocation of resources.
As previously stated, we find two instances where
participants are likely to negotiate for resources: 1)
Between SPs and VNBs and 2) Between VNBs and the
Resource pool or Resource Providers.2
Figure 5 shows an overview of the expected
interactions in each of the aforementioned settings.
Resource Providers Resource Pool Virtual Network 
Builders
Service Providers End UsersEnd Users
Current Resource 
providers  demand
x Minimum acceptable 
price
x Resource characteristics 
and availability
x Minimum acceptable 
price
x Resource characteristics 
and availability
x Service-specific demand
x Maximum willingness to 
pay




x Resource use status
Seeks resources that match:
x Customer-oriented 
demand
x Max. willingness to pay
x Customer-specific offer
x Price to pay for resources
x Provide specialized 
services
x Fulfill end-users demand
2 3
Figure 5. Interactions among network participants for obtainingresource access
As presented in [16], matching problems refer to
those that involve “matching of the members of one
group of agents with one or more members of a second,
disjoint group of agents, all of whom have preferences
over the possible resulting matches”. The goal in this
type of problems is to find a stable outcome, where
there are no two agents that would prefer to be matched
to each other rather than keeping their current matches.
Given the characteristics of the network entities and the
relationships/interactions we expect them to establish,
we find it suitable to analyze them through the lenses
of matching markets.
2The interactions with the resource pool can be seen as indirect
interactions with the Resource Providers as the latter are the owners
or licensees of the available resources.
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SP – VNB Interactions. We consider it appropriate
to define this type of interactions as the formation
of partnerships between SPs and VNBs. Along these
lines, the specialized demand of each SP and the
VNB requirements can be translated into sets of
preferences. These preferences should serve to rank
the members of the other set of possible partners and
thus attempt to establish partnerships with the highest
ranked ones. From the SPs perspective, the preferences
may be defined in terms of the expected resources to
obtain from a given VNB, the VNBs’ reputation, their
maximum willingness to pay and whether they are risk
averse or prone. From the perspective of VNBs, their
preferences may stem from the minimum payment they
expect to receive, the expected partnership duration,
the reputation of the SPs and their possibility to obtain
an SP’s required resources.
We contemplate the utilization of matching markets
for carrying out the partnership formation process
between these two entities. We find that the deferred
acceptance algorithm proposed in [16] and extended
to more complex settings in [17] can be adapted to
the situation we study. In this way, each member of
the SP set will propose a partnership to its preferred
VNB. In turn, each VNB will evaluate its partnership
proposals and temporarily accept the one that ranks
highest in its own preference set. The SPs that have
been rejected propose a partnership to the next VNB
in their preference set. As expected, each VNB will
choose their most preferred SP from its proposals. This
process repeats until all SPs have been matched to a
VNB, or until those without a match have been rejected
by every VNB in their preference set. Note that some SPs
may prefer to remain unmatched rather than forming a
partnership that is unprofitable.
The problem of matching markets for spectrum
sharing is explored in [18]. In this work, we consider
a “many-to-one” matching process between VNBs and
SPs, which means that an SP can form a partnership
with only one VNB, while a VNB can form a partnership
with as many SPs as present in the market. Additionally,
we focus on providing an overview of the multiple
factors that would play a role in this matching process.
Hence, the results show the influence of the VNBs’
reputation in the resulting number of partnerships. In
turn, under the set of preferences studied, we evaluate
the percentage of the overall geographic demand
that is covered through the resulting partnerships.
This process sheds light on how a matching model
could alleviate some of the complexity stemming from
spectrum sharing arrangements.
Figure 6 depicts a general overview of the partnership
formation process between SPs and VNBs.
VNB – Resource Pool Interactions. Once the set of
VNB – SP partnerships have been defined, each VNB
Resource Providers Resource Pool Virtual Network 
Builders
Service Providers End Users
Initial Matching between Service 
Providers and Virtual Network Builders
Criteria for matching preferences may 
include:
x Fees charged by VNBs
x SPs  maximum willingness to pay
x Amount of resources requested
x Geographical proximity
x SPs and VNBs reputation
End Users
Figure 6. Matching process between VNBs and SPs
needs to obtain an appropriate bundle of resources
from the pool. These resources correspond to the
aggregate demand of all the partners of a given VNB.
In order to reflect the influence of pricing mechanisms
and to ensure that spectrum resources are assigned
to those users who value them most, we consider a
simple auction mechanism to carry out the VNB – RP
interactions. This approach does not drive us far apart
from the matching concept. As presented by Roth in
[19], auctions are matching markets where preferences
are defined in terms of prices, and the latter determine
who obtains the resources3.
The specific process we propose for this set of
interactions is portrayed in figure 7. This approach
follows the model presented in [21].
Resource Providers Resource Pool Virtual Network 
Builders
Service Providers End UsersEnd Users
Initial price for each resource in 
the pool
x Corresponds to the reserve 
price of the RPs.
Allocate resources: 
x Each resource associated 
with 1 VNB.
x If resources are associated 
with more than 1 VNB, 
increase price
Aggregate resources from the 
pool according to:
x Customer demand
x Price to pay
Place bid on selected resources
Adjust bid according to:
x Current price in the auction




Return to 4 - until all resources 
are allocated; all VNBs have 
resources or there are no price 
changes in the last x rounds 
Figure 7. VNBs’ interactions with the pool to aggregateresources and gain access.
Feedback Mechanism. For this approach to function
properly, we consider it important to include a feedback
3A more detailed description of these interactions within a more
general spectrum sharing context can be found in [20]
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mechanism which permits every participant to adjust
their preferences and advertised parameters. These
updates allow the market participants to become more
competitive in the market and minimize their losses. In
the particular case of VNBs, past performance is crucial
for developing a meaningful reputation mechanism,
which would also have an impact on the VNBs that an
SP may prefer.
Interaction with the SAS. The interactions previously
describe account for the market between RPs, VNBs
and SPs. Nevertheless, it is important to remember
that if a VNB assigns resources belonging to the 3.5
GHz – 3.7 GHz band, it should still register these
assignments with the SAS database. In this way, we
would have only a few entities (i.e., the VNBs) reporting
the usage of a larger number of SPs, which may
minimize the number of transactions required to fulfill
this registration process.
5. AnEconomicsFramework
The definition of participants’ interactions is framed
within markets concepts which account for part of the
economics framework definition of our proposal. In
this section, we extend this framework and present
additional concepts which permit to provide an
appropriate context for our sharing scheme.
5.1. The Innovative Architecture from an EconomicsPerspective
Innovation has driven significant changes, not only
in the technological field, but also on the markets
developed to sustain and spread that innovation. In
order to place our virtualization ideas within the
appropriate context, we point out some significant
similarities between our study and the work developed
by Hagel and Seeley-Brown in [22].
From the various proposals presented in [22], we
find an important similarity between our virtualized
approaches and the concept of reverse markets. In
such markets, customers can seek the greatest possible
value from a broad set of providers which are
available at an appropriate time and place. Reverse
markets have further led to the design of process
networks, which are in charge of mobilizing “highly
specialized companies across more than one level of
an extended business process”[22]. Process networks
adopt a pull model “where resources are flexibly
provided in response to a specific market demand”[22].
When the network needs cannot be easily determined
in advance, operators and providers could create
platforms permitting them to mobilize their resources
readily. This model further suggests a different means
to deal with uncertainty given that it can “help people
come together and innovate by drawing on a growing
array of specialized and distributed resources” [23]. In
this light, the ultimate benefit from process networks
and pull systems, in terms of uncertainty, would be
the possibility of not seeing it as a threat, but as an
opportunity to innovate[23].
In this context, we could also associate the charac-
teristics of the VNB with that of a process orchestrator,
which is an entity in charge of organizing and managing
process networks. Some of its duties include determin-
ing the eligibility of an entity to participate in the
process network; defining the role of each participant
in particular process implementation and ensuring that
each participant performs as expected and is rewarded
accordingly [22]. The orchestrators should focus on
expanding the range of participants and creating strong
relationships among them. In this way, more specialized
skills are accessible, and at the same time, the collabo-
rating parties can build their capabilities faster[23].
To summarize, the local and global models we present
in this work adapt to the pull system studied in[22],
given that it explores the possibility of generating
supply from the aggregation of (specialized) resources
belonging to different entities. Additionally, it aims at
managing local resource assignment by means of a
general orchestrator, which in our models corresponds
to the Virtual Network Builder. Since we are dealing
with a framework in which different entities (SPs) are
providing a service with the aggregation of resources
belonging to other operators (RPs), we envision a
service-based type of competition. In this way, it
is important to shed some light on the nuances,
opportunities and challenges of switching from a
traditional facility-based competition to service-based
competition.
5.2. Facility-based vs. Service-based competition
When we analyze facility (or infrastructure)-based com-
petition and contrast it with service-based competition,
we are not facing a “black or white” type of situ-
ation. Instead, we find a wide range of possibilities
and arrangements between these two poles. This has
important implications in terms of the complexity of
the strategies adopted by incumbents and entrants and
the regulatory schemes that are optimal.
At the core of these competition decisions, we have a
set of trade-offs that incumbents and entrants should
take into account. Indeed, each user will decide to
enter in either arrangement depending on the level of
profitability that it represents. For instance, incumbents
should evaluate the benefit from investing in their own
infrastructure and sharing it with new entrants versus
the possible threat of competing with new market
entrants who possess their own market infrastructure.
New entrants, on the other hand, should determine how
limited their competitiveness will be in the market if
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they are subject to the lease arrangements provided
by the incumbents, and at the same time, they should
contrast those limitations with the investment required
for deploying their own infrastructure (i.e., opportunity
cost of technology adoption)[24, 25].
Referring to a traditional view of networks, we
find that it widely favors facility-based competition
and sees service-based competition as the stepping
stone for the rise of the first. Nevertheless, if we
adopt the process networks perspective presented
in subsection 5.1, we could envision models and
systems that successfully operate under service-
based competition. Furthermore, when adapting our
virtualization considerations, a wider array of resource
usage models can be considered, which not only
represents additional service opportunities for the new
entrants, but also decreases the threat that these users
can pose to the incumbents, e.g., threat caused by new
entrants providing the same service as the incumbent.
Moreover, the aggregation and assignment activities
of the VNB could make the negotiation process
easier for entrants and incumbents, thus reducing the
associated costs. In this way, we would obtain positive
conditions for a successful switch toward service-based
competition.
5.3. Value Chains vs. Value Networks
According to [12], “[t]he value chain includes all the
activities that exist as a direct result of usage of the
cellular network. The purpose of creating the chain
is to understand where the costs are incurred and
the revenue is generated”. Generally, a value chain
is associated with a particular network operator or
incumbent, and it will help to determine the activities
that will be more profitable. Due to the significant
changes in spectrum sharing arrangements, technology
use and service availability, we can expect that the
traditional value chain will shift to new perspectives in
which, not only an incumbent’s view on how to derive
value from its resources and make profits is considered;
instead, we might be interested in a new approach
which encompasses the interactions of multiple users
for generating valued services.
We have already evidenced examples that portray
significant changes in the structure of value chains,
such as the appearance of MVNOs, the evolution of
Wi-Fi which has turned its hotspots into important
complements of regular mobile networks, and also the
creation of over-the-top services. From these examples,
one can notice that different parts of the value chain
that generate revenue, can be actually controlled by
entities different from those that have deployed and
control the parts associated with the highest costs [12].
In this way, as value chains continue to evolve, it is
possible to observe how various value chains become
intertwined for the creation of more complex networks
where different entities are simultaneously involved in
more than one value chain. We can refer to these as value
networks.
A value network presents multiple entry and exit
points, which increase the complexity of operations
for all the members involved[26]. Additionally, it is
expected that this network will be formed by “different
actors drawn form a range of industries that collectively
provide goods and services to the end users”[26].
For this purpose, these industries should show a
higher level of specialization in particular activities,
instead of managing the overall production of services.
Furthermore, the companies involved are expected to
dynamically evolve and perhaps specialize and gain
expertise in additional areas. Hence, for the final service
provision, relationships among multiple, specialized
companies should be established[26].
This new notion of specialization and interaction
among entities, calls for the modification of the bound-
aries of a company, which is evidently accompanied by
a corresponding trade-off: value of specialization versus
the transaction costs associated with external suppliers
[26]. In this light, for setting their boundaries, firms
should consider a balance between facing low transac-
tion costs from internal production of services, hence
lower agency costs, and the economies of scale derived
from obtaining resources from external entities[26].
Ultimately, the interaction of multiple users proposed
by the value network approach permits us to study a
firm’s relationship with other network members and
thus understand where value lies in the network and
how it is created by multiple parties; how the activities
of a firm will affect the network and how other members
are likely to respond [27].
From the concepts presented in this section, we
can find the relationship between value networks
and process networks, which are illustrated in Figure
8. Both mechanisms envision the aggregation of
specialized entities to provide valued services, targeting
at the deployment of service-driven networks and the
accompanying type of competition.
6. Puttingthings together
Analyzing the network presented in figure 4, as a whole,
we can point out important details that map to the
concepts presented throughout this paper.
The entities in this network may have different
degrees of specialization in multiple areas. In turn,
these entities share their resources with others,
thus promoting the development and provision of
additional, perhaps more specialized services. This
creates intertwined value chains as there is greater
value extracted from a set of resources initially owned
and used by a reduced group of incumbents or RPs.
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Figure 8. Similarities between Process and Value Networks.
Additionally, this translates in a wider array of services
provided throughout the network, which defines it as a
service-based competition environment.
From the perspective of the RPs, there are increased
opportunities for analyzing whether participation in
the pool results in a profitable arrangement. This
presents them with options to continue to participate,
increase their participation or exit the network. The
SPs at the other end of the network will generate a
dynamic demand, dependent on the type of service that
lies at the core of their business model. This represents
less restrictions in terms of resource access and thus
definition of the service to provide.
In a traditional system-based competition model,
each SP would need to negotiate with every RP from
which it requires resources. This is not a practical
solution in terms of transaction costs, and possible
restrictions in the establishment of leasing agreements
with RPs. In the network we study, both RPs and SPs
will negotiate resource access with a single entity: the
VNB. In fact, the VNB will aggregate the required
type and amount of resources based on the demand
of the SPs, which is expected to be service-specific and
dynamic. At the same time, the VNB should be in charge
of providing the appropriate compensation to the RPs
and/or negotiating with the SAS depending on the type
of resources accessed.
Note that the flexible management of the resources
belonging to the pool responds to the utilization
of an enabling technology such as wireless network
virtualization. In this way, the co-existence of multiple
RPs and SPs would be ensured. It is evident that there
is a greater degree of flexibility stemming from this
network when compared with traditional system-based
or facility-based competition arrangements. In the case
of the latter, we can expect higher transaction costs
associated with negotiations, given that specific leasing
agreements should be developed among particular RPs
and SPs, on a one-to-one basis. In the virtualized
case, the negotiation is done through the VNB, which
reduces the resulting overhead and allows for the
seamless negotiation with multiple entities at a time.
However, when designing the negotiation mechanisms
between the VNBs and the SPs, we should take into
account a framework that reduces agency costs, thus
deterring strategic behaviors which could affect the
overall welfare in the system.
7. Conclusions
We propose the incorporation of virtualization to the
regulatory framework defined by the FCC for the
3.5GHz band and thus formulate a sharing proposal
which encompasses the flexibility opportunities offered
by them. The analysis we present does not reflect
regulatory and technical considerations only, it also
explores economic factors that play a key role for the
deployment of successful sharing models.
The studied fields pose important challenges and
opportunities for the sharing model we devise. In
this way, we have been able to find some benefits
that could stem from embedding virtualization as
the technical enabler for sharing approaches. Indeed,
virtualization would permit to add technical flexibility
to the network, which is required to accomplish the
regulatory flexibility that the current regulation seeks.
By means of this technology, resources with distinct
physical characteristics and ownership can be pooled
and made available, in a seamless manner, to a larger
number of providers.
We have pointed out how the addition of a new
entity, the Virtual Network Builder, could allow for the
distribution of the functionality that has been assigned
entirely to the SAS. Furthermore, the VNB could act
as a facilitator of the negotiations between RPs and
SPs. In this way, it is likely that smaller entrants will
have higher opportunities to access spectrum. This
results from having a VNB in charge of aggregating
the demand from multiple users and negotiating for
spectrum access. In this way, the VNBs could be better
competitors in the market than smaller entities alone,
and their possibilities to obtain resources may be
significantly enhanced.
In the economics context, we found significant
similarities between the characteristics and objectives
of process networks and those of value networks.
When adapting these concepts to our model, we expect
virtualization to allow for a seamless aggregation
of resources from multiple entities thus permitting
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to exploit the specialization of network entities
at their edge. This would provide an avenue for
achieving common or service-differentiated business
objectives, which could lead to appealing service-
based competition opportunities taking place in current
telecommunications market scenarios. Overall, our
analyzed framework suggests that in an environment
where multiple users with varied levels and areas of
specialization come together to innovate, we could
actually derive opportunities instead of threats from the
uncertainty of sharing.
8. FutureWork
In our efforts to extend our work, we consider it
important to delve into details regarding how rights are
adapted to these novel sharing schemes and, how social
concepts and constructs influence the deployment of
accurate models. Following the study presented in
[28], we expect bundles of rights to be redefined
in virtualized scenarios, which will in turn have a
significant impact on the model design, outcomes and
evaluation.
From a social perspective, our analysis of process
and value networks has shed light on the interaction
of multiple entities in order to achieve common
and service-differentiated business objectives. In turn,
these entities will be sharing assets, which could
be mapped to the common-pool resource definition. 4
Keeping this in mind, and as explored by Ostrom
in [29], we could expect collective-action problems to
arise under our virtualization scenarios. As pointed
out by Ostrom, a possible solution is the adoption
of polycentric governance approaches, which implies
the development of systems of governmental and
non-governmental organizations working at multiple
scales. The authors in [14] have already explored the
inclusion of CPR concepts and polycentric governance
to the design of the SAS and how this would help
define facilitating conditions for the development of
successful systems. In this way, we consider that
analyzing CPR and Polycentric governance notions
would provide us with a richer view on how to design
our virtualization system.
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actors can simultaneously use the resource system and efforts to
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